Ⅰ. Introduction
Over the past few decades, the interchange of human activities has become more and more globalized. In order to regulate activity on a global scale, not only states but also international organizations, informal intergovernmental networks, domestic administrative agencies, and even Prof. Anne-Marie Slaughter, have argued that the new legal order in the era of globalization is not a centralized but a disaggregated one, and is focused on both international formal or informal networks. 1) The word 'network' is not strictly defined here and includes great range of interactions among states, institutions and individuals, from the mere exchange of information to the setting rules and even executing them.
Slaughter asserts that both international and domestic courts also form a kind of network. 2) Some scholars, including Slaughter, have referred to this as a kind of international dialogue or deliberation among courts. 3) However, in Slaughter's entire image of the 'new world order,' the role of the courts and the inter-courts-network remains poorly defined. In order to bring further clarity to this point, I would like to examine the international dialogue among the courts, particularly in light of the issues of democratic legitimation.
For this purpose, I will at first briefly discuss what the phenomenon of the international dialogue among the courts actually is. Second, I will offer a more carefully examination of international courts, addressing their functions and limits. Third, I will examine the functions and limits of domestic courts within the network of courts. Finally, I will conclude this essay with a short comment on the relationships between 1) Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 261ff. (2004) . 2) Ibid., at 65ff. 3) See, e.g ., Claire L'Heureux-Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact of the Renquist Court, 34 Tulsa L.J. 15, 17 (1998) . Slaughter also cites this L'Heureux-Dubé's paper (Slaughter, supra note 1, at 74).
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Ⅱ. What is International Dialogue among Courts?
When the word 'network' is used in the context of globalization, people usually image assemblies of administrative agencies or domestic regulators, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 4) Is there any similar entity for courts? Probably the answer is no. Of course, previously some international conferences of judges have been held, and judges have had interactions among themselves. 5) However, they do not work systematically and they have few or unclear effects on individual cases. 6) This means that any rules directly applied in concrete cases are not made through such conferences and judges decide the case before them without input from any outside judges but based solely on their own assessments, unlike what occurs in the rule making done by networks of administrative agencies.
Thus international dialogue or deliberation indicates, at best, mutual references to judgments. For a long time, courts have consulted not only their own precedents but also foreign judgments of similar cases to 4) See, e.g., P-H. Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 Yale J. Int'l L. 113, 132-143 (2009) 1375, 1381-1382 (2008) . To the further argument over international public authority, see, ibid., at 1383ff.. 14) Von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 12, at 52-59, points out that the major functions of international courts are settling disputes (adjudication in the strictest sense), stabilizing normative expectations, making laws and controlling and legitimating (another) public authority. 15) Of course, consent by states, the traditional source of legitimacy, is still and important moment for legitimation, but it is, von Bogdandy thinks, not enough. However, despite the merits of their argument, it seems to me that Benvensti and Downs fail to indicate exactly what kind of courts should aggressively apply foreign or international law. Furthermore, their approach contains a contradiction that is difficult to overlook; while they approve of courts applying or referring to foreign or international law, they also criticize executives for introducing international legal norms unilaterally. 43) In order to solve these problems, it is essential that we understand their argument, which I explain below. Namely, on one hand, the courts are to positively apply the international human rights law that guarantees individual citizens the right to access to political deliberation or the democratic process. On the other hand, they can only refer to foreign cases when they need to know how courts in other countries defend the same or similar fundamental value or structure in their own constitutions. Through this kind of restructuring of Benvensti and Downs' argument, we can begin to view it as a version of the process theory, which Prof. John H. Ely and his follower have proposed.
Lastly I wonder why domestic courts, not international courts, are the guardians of democracy. Of course, a domestic court of a certain state is most familiar to domestic democracy or the constitutional principles of the state in question state. However, as to international law such as human rights law, I would say that, international courts do better as the guardian. Actually Benvensti and Downs have already answered this question. They argue that international courts are less independent from political organization than domestic courts. Therefore domestic courts are more suitable for fighting against political unilateralism. 44) Here we can Rev. 199, 208-209 (2007 In the next section, we will examine this more detailed standard from various pragmatic perspectives. At the end of the last section, I suggested the importance of providing a pragmatic justification for the reference to foreign or international law precedents. But why should we cite foreign or international law precedents, when many similar decisions are found in foreign or international courts? Prof. Eric A. Posner and Prof. Cass R.
Pragmatic Justification
Sunstein give us the answer to this question. 51) The Condorcet Jury Theorem, they submit, explains why it is significant to refer to cases that are outside of our own state and show us the limits of citation too. 52) As is well known, the Jury Theorem submits that in a case in which every individual member of a certain group has the greatest possibility of making a correct decision, then the more people take part in the vote, the greater the possibly that the vote result will be correct, when these members vote independently. 53) Posner and Sunstein apply this theorem to the cases for the following foreign or international decisions.
Concretely they list up three conditions for following foreign practices. See, e.g., Krishna K. Ladha, The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes, 36 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 617, 617-618 (1992 Let me add some additional explanations. First, the theorem assumes that each voter has a greater possibly of making the right decision. It means, in order to be counted as a voter, one must have enough and relevant information. This is why Posner and Sunstein enumerate condition 1. Second, the Jury Theorem originally deals with a case that focused on a certain question. Therefore other state's decisions must been made under a sufficiently similar situation (condition 2). Third, condition 3 is clearly included in the definition of the theorem, which requires an independent vote. This framework of Posner and Sunstein successfully elucidates, I think, at most points the reasons and the criteria that can be followed by other states or international community, although it is difficult to decide whether the conditions are fulfilled or not. 57) Posner and Sunstein actually cast doubt on the judicial competence needed to judge the fulfillment of these conditions in concrete cases. 58) This demonstrates that when we evaluate the courts' reference to foreign or international cases, we have to take the capacity 56) Ibid., [144] [145] In my original report in National Taiwan University, on which this paper is based, Prof. Ginsburg pointed out the difficulty associated with inquiring into the similarity and independency at the same time. I suppose the word 'similarity' means that the situation in question is not far from that of the referred case, while 'independency' eliminates mimicry or obedience to the other judgments. Thus these requests, I think, could be fulfilled simultaneously, even though the associated difficulty is not completely erased. of courts into consideration.
Another point that I shall mention is they distinctly separate foreign law and international law 59) , even though others often mix them. 60) They devote most of their thesis to questions about following foreign practices and only a few comments on international law. These two professors advocate that 'a domestic court should not place any weight on international treaties, except as the equivalent of "vote" by each of the parties'. 61) However, I think this does not deny the utility of three conditions as criteria. In other words, this criteria is, I think, to be said the universal one. Thus it justifies reference to not only human rights law but also all kinds of law. Here, I would like to summarize the argument above. First, international dialogue among courts means the interaction of courts or horizontal and vertical reference among courts. Second, democratic legitimacy based on the general public must be taken into account when we evaluate the dialogue. Third, with an understanding and respecting mutual independency and originality, courts should check each other through cross-referencing. In particular, subsidiarity is needed in vertical interactions. Finally courts shall decide whether a certain precedent is followed under the three conditions lead from the Condorcet Jury Theorem.
Lastly I would like to mention one more point. Interestingly Slaughter asserts that in an era of disaggregated sovereignty like what we are experiencing today, five norms must be observed if we are to build a just world order: deliberative equality, legitimate difference, positive comity, check and balance, and finally subsidiarity. 68) When comparing these with the discussion above, you would find some accordance between them. This seems to demonstrate that Slaughter's normative evaluation of 'network' also basically applies to the international interaction of courts or international 'dialogue' among courts. 68) Slaughter, supra note 1, at 244ff.. 
